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CHAPTER 24 
Legislative Process and Statutory 
Interpretation 
SIDNEY A. AISNER 
The 1954 session of the General Court began on January 6 and 
ended on June 11. Although the largest number of bills in the Com-
monwealth's history were introduced, prorogation occurred on the ear-
liest date since 1937. The General Court passed 687 bills and 126 re-
solves which received executive approval. The Governor returned 
one bill, the "wire tap" bill (Senate No. 144), to the Senate with his 
objections thereto in writing, and his objections were sustained. This 
bill provided for restricting the authority of the attorney general and 
district attorneys to authorize wire tapping. 
When the General Court prorogued, there were two resolves and 
six bills which had been placed before the Governor for his approval. 
These enactments were not signed by the Governor and never became 
law. 
The General Court adopted a proposal for a legislative amendment 
to the Massachusetts Constitution providing four-year terms for gov-
ernor, lieutenant governor, state secretary, treasurer and receiver gen-
eral, attorney general, and auditor. This amendment will become 
part of the Constitution if it is similarly adopted in a joint session of 
the General Court in 1955 and approved by the people at the next 
state election. 
Three bills were passed at the extra session of the General Court 
held on September 7-8, and they received executive approval. 
A. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
§24.1. Contempt of the General Court: The case of Otis A. Hood. 
Chapter 89 of the Resolves of 1953 provided for the establishment of a 
Special Commission, to consist of two senators, three representatives, 
and two persons to be appointed by the Governor, for the purpose of 
conducting an investigation and study of Communism and subversive 
activities and related matters "that would aid the General Court in 
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enacting any remedial legislation." The Commission was empowered 
to hold public hearings; to require by summons the attendance of wit-
nesses and the production of books, papers, and documents; and to 
take testimony. Further, the Commission could, by majority vote, is-
sue summonses, and any member had authority to administer oaths to 
witnesses. The resolve contained the following provision: "Every 
person who, having been summoned as a witness by said commission, 
or any subcommittee thereof, willfully makes default, or who, having 
appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the investigation 
hereby authorized, shall be guilty of contempt and shall be subject to 
a fine of two hundred dollars or to imprisonment for not more than 
one month, or both." 1 
In the course of its investigation, the Commission summoned one 
Otis A. Hood of Boston to appear before it at a hearing to be held 
on March 18, 1954. Upon his appearance he refused to be sworn as a 
witness without first receiving witness fees to which he claimed he was 
entitled prior to being sworn as a witness. He stated to the Commis-
sion, "I am not ready to be sworn. This commission owes me a wit-
ness fee from the last time I was here, and I want that witness fee and 
this witness fee ... I will be reimbursed right now. I won't take any 
chances." Upon being ordered by the chairman to take the oath, 
Hood replied, "I will not take the oath without having received my 
witness fee." He was thereupon advised by the chairman that it was 
the judgment of the Commission to cite him for contempt before the 
legislature. To this Hood stated, "I think it would be preferable if 
you pay the fee as you are supposed to . .. You are asking for eight-
een thousand dollars for more funds. What are you doing with it, 
padding your expense accounts?" 
Hood was then requested to sign a form of certificate for witness 
fees and was assured by the chairman that the witness fees would be 
mailed to him. Although Hood signed the certificate, he persistently 
refused to be sworn and testify before receiving the money, stating, "1 
will not take the oath without the money. Why don't some of you 
loan it out of your pocket? You have plenty ... " It was only after 
he was paid a witness fee by the Commission's counsel that he took the 
oath. At one point, after being informed by the chairman that the 
Commission would not be drawn into an argument with him, he 
stated, "I would like to have an argument." He refused, on constitu-
tional grounds, to answer almost all of the questions put to him. 
After the public hearing, the Commission voted to cite Otis A. 
Hood for contempt. On March 30, 1954, the Commission filed with 
the General Court a Partial Report,2 in which it stated: 
Because of certain contemptuous behavior on the part of a wit-
ness called before the commission on the eighteenth day of March, 
it was felt that the work of the commission would be considerably 
~24.1. 1 Compare this provision with C.L., c. 7, §ll. 
2 Honse Doc. 2645 (1954). 
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hampered unless some definite action were taken. The commis-
sion has therefore voted to recommend to the General Court that 
the Opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court be 
required relative to the right of the General Court to proceed 
with contempt proceedings, and if affirmative answers are received 
from the said Justices that contempt proceedings be brought, and 
have enclosed the following Orders. 
The first order referred to was for the Opinions of the Justices of 
the Supreme Judicial Court on certain "important questions of law" 
arising in connection with the second order, which provided for 
Hood's being adjudged in contempt and punished. 
The questions submitted were as follows: 
1. Is the Special Commission established under chapter eighty-
nine of the Resolves of nineteen hundred and fifty-three a com-
mittee or commission of the General Court so that disrespect or 
contemptuous behavior toward it by a witness duly summoned by 
it to give testimony before it, constitutes contempt of the Gen-
eral Court within the meaning of Articles X and XI of Section 
III of Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution of the Common-
wealth? 
2. Does the General Court have power and authority under 
Articles X and XI of said Section III to adjudicate in contempt 
and punish a person who was guilty of disrespectful and contemp-
tuous behavior, as above described, before such Special Commis-
sion? 
3. If the General Court has such power and authority, must the 
person who was guilty of such disrespectful and contemptuous 
behavior be brought before the bar of the General Court and 
heard before being adjudged in contempt and ordered com-
mitted? 
The order for the Opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial 
Court was adopted by the House of Representatives on April 1, 1954, 
and by the Senate in concurrence on April 6. It was transmitted to 
the Justices on April 7. On April 22, a communication3 containing 
the Opinions of the Justices was filed in the office of the Clerk of the 
House. Questions 1 and 2 were each answered in the negative, in 
view of which question 3 became inapplicable. 
Articles X and XI referred to in the questions provide, in part, that 
the House of Representatives and the Senate "shall have authority to 
punish by imprisonment, every person, not a member, who shall be 
guilty of disrespect to the house (or senate), by any disorderly, or con-
temptuous behavior, in its presence ... " The Court, in its opinion,4 
stated that these powers of the General Court do not extend to a spe-
cial commission composed partly of members of the legislature and 
"House Doc. 2758 (1954). 
• Opinion of the Justices, 19,,4 Mass. Adv. Sh. 405, 119 N.E.2d 38,;. 
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partly of other persons. The Justices asserted, "We do not overlook 
decisions and legislative practice upholding the proposition that con-
temptuous conduct before a committee composed entirely of members 
of a house is a contempt of the house." 5 
The Court drew a distinction between a committee composed en-
tirely of legislators and a mixed commission of legislators and others 
on the ground that while it was "possible to regard" a purely 
legislator-staffed committee as a "working part of the house" and while 
performing its duties as being "invested with the dignity of the house 
itself so that contemptuous conduct against such a committee is di-
rected against the house as a whole," 6 it was not possible to take this 
view of the mixed commission, since it is "not a part of the house but 
is merely an independent body to which certain members of the house 
as individuals belong." 7 (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Court asserted this to be true even where the mixed commis-
sion is "assigned tasks which aid the General Court in the performance 
of its duties." 8 
The questions submitted to the Court were confined to the General 
Court's powers under Articles X and XI of the Constitution, and the 
Court therefore properly did not consider whether or not Hood could 
be prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the resolve creating 
the Commission, or whether he could be compelled to testify under 
the provisions of Chapter 233, Section 10 of the General Laws. 
Pending before the General Court at the time of the Hood proceed-
ings was a bill 9 entitled "An Act providing that a witness who refuses 
to testify at a hearing before the General Court or either branch 
thereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." This bill, patterned gen-
erally on the federal statutes,lO provided, in part, as follows: 
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the au-
thority of either branch of the General Court or both, jointly, to 
give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under in-
quiry before either branch, or any committee established by a re-
solve or a joint order of the two branches, or any committee of 
either branch, wilfully makes default, or who having appeared, 
refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under in-
quiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a 
fine of not more than one thousand dollars nor less than one 
hundred dollars and imprisonment in a common jail for not less 
than one month nor more than twelve months. 
It should be noted that this bill made no specific mention of special 
commissions but did include "any committee established by a resolve 
or a joint order of the two branches." 
51954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 409, 119 N.E.2d at 387. 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 410, 119 N.E.2d at 388. 
• Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
• Senate No. 321 (1954). 
10 2 lJ.S.C.A. §§192. 194 (1927). 11 Stat. 155 (1857). 
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The bill was referred to and considered by the Joint Committee on 
the Judiciary, which, on April 5, reported a new draftll entitled "An 
Act providing a penalty for the refusal by a witness to appear, testify 
or produce papers before the General Court or either branch thereof 
or before committees or commissions acting under authority thereof." 
The new bill specifically included a "special commission consisting in 
whole or in part of members of the general court" and provided a 
criminal penalty for a willful default or refusal to testify. Neither bill 
covered disrespectful, disorderly, or contemptuous behavior.l2 The 
new draft, to which an emergency preamble was added, was enacted 
by the General Court and signed by the Governor on May 20, 1954, 
becoming Chapter 454 and inserting a new Section 28A in Chapter 3 
of the General Laws. 
In view of this enactment, the resolvel3 reviving and continuing the 
Special Commission Established to Study and Investigate Commu-
nism and Subversive Activities did not include the provision, set forth 
above, relative to the willful default or refusal to answer of a witness 
summoned by the Commission but contained instead the following 
provision: "Every person who behaves in a disorderly or contemptu-
ous manner before such commission shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor punishable as provided in section twenty-eight A of chapter 
three of the General Laws." 
§24.2. The Legislative Research Council and Legislative Research 
Bureau. A significant development of the 1954 session of the General 
Court was the enactment of legislation l establishing a Legislative Re-
search Council and a Legislative Research Bureau to constitute a "re-
search staff which shall perform its duties in a manner completely im-
partial and nonpartisan at all times and in conformance with the 
highest standards of research practice for the assistance and benefit of 
the members, committees and commissions of the General Court." 
The Council consists of two senators and four representatives, desig-
nated annually by the president and speaker, respectively, the mem-
bership from each branch being divided equally between the two ma-
jor political parties. The members of the Council serve without 
compensation directly under the General Court.2 
The Council determines all policies with respect to a legislative re-
search program, while the Legislative Research Bureau has the task 
of carrying out the research tasks assigned to it by the Council,3 
The Council appoints "a person qualified by education, training 
and experience" to be the director of the Bureau and also "such as-
sistants to the director as are necessary to carry out the program of 
11 Senate No. 716 (1954). 
19 In this connection see G.L., c. 34, §13. 
,. Resolves of 1954, c. 123. 
§24.2. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 607. 
2 G.L., c. 3, §56, inserted by Acts of 1954, c. 607. 
3Id. §57. 
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statistical research and fact-finding required by the council." 4 The 
Bureau will make reports to the Council, and the Council will report 
at least annually to the General Court. 5 
Massachusetts thus becomes the thirty-fourth state to adopt a legis-
lative research agency. Such an agency was first established in Kansas 
in 1933. The ever increasing volume and complexity of legislative 
matters in recent years, much of which is of a highly technical and 
specialized nature, has given rise to the need for a legislative research 
staff. Such a staff, working in close cooperation with the State Li-
brary, particularly its Legislative Research Division, should become a 
valuable aid to the General Court in providing the necessary research 
and information for its legislative programs. 
It was not contemplated that the Legislative Research Council and 
Legislative Research Bureau would eliminate entirely the need for 
special commissions. The new law specifically provides that the Coun-
cil and Bureau will be "for the assistance and benefit of the members, 
committees and commissions of the general court." The number of 
special commissions should, in time, decrease, however, and their tasks 
should be made easier by the existence of the new Council and Bu-
reau. 
§24.3. Home rule. In his Annual Message to the two branches of 
the legislature on January 8, 1953, Governor Herter stated: "In gen-
eral, it is my belief that the State Government ought not to legislate 
on matters which are strictly local in their character, or affect the ad-
ministrative functions of local officials in particular cases." 
In 1953, a proposal was filed for a legislative amendment to the 
Constitution relative to the enactment of laws affecting particular cit-
ies, towns, or districts, which provided, in substance, that no law 
should be passed by the General Court "which affects in any manner 
the form of government or the powers, rights, duties, property or af-
fairs of a particular city, town or . . . district, or of any officer or 
agency thereof acting in its behalf, except with its approval or upon 
its request ... " 1 The Committee on Constitutional Law reported in 
each branch that the amendment ought not to pass and the report was 
placed on file in accordance with the requirement of Joint Rule 23. 
No further action was taken on the measure. 
In 1954, a similar proposal was filed. 2 This time the same commit-
tee reported that the amendment "ought to pass," but no further ac-
tion was taken after the report was placed on file in accordance with 
the rule. Joint Rule 23 provides, in part: "In each branch the re-
port shall be read and placed on file; and no further legislative action 
shall be taken on the measure unless consideration in joint session is 
called for by vote of either branch, in accordance with the provisions 
• Id. §58. 
5 Id. §61. 
§24.3. 1 House No. 889 (1953). 
2 House No. 1849 (1954). 
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of Section 2 of Part IV of Article XLVIII of the Amendments of the 
Constitution." 
The arguments in favor of such an amendment are basically that 
local matters should be within the control of local officials and that 
the great volume of legislation with which the General Court is an-
nually forced to deal would thereby be reduced. Opponents cite the 
traditional right of free petitionS and the wisdom of retaining legisla-
tive control over actions of local officials. 
With the placing on file of the report on the proposed "home rule" 
amendment, the legislature considered the report of the Committee 
on Rules of the two branches, acting concurrently, recommending that 
the Joint Rules be amended by striking out Rules 7A and 7B and in-
serting in their place a single rule4 combining the two and broadening 
the prohibition against the admission of certain bills affecting a city or 
town without its consent. Existing Rule 7 A requires the approval of 
a county, city, or town in connection with legislation authorizing it 
"to reinstate in its service a person formerly employed by it." Rule 
7B requires the approval of a county, city, or town in connection with 
legislation authorizing it 
to retire or pension or grant an annuity to any person, or to in-
crease any retirement allowance, pension or annuity, or to pay 
any sum of money in the nature of a pension or retirement allow-
ance, or to pay any salary which would have accrued to a deceased 
official or employee but for his death, or to pay any claim for 
damages or otherwise, or to alter the benefits or change the re-
strictions of any county or municipal retirement or pension law, 
or, in the case of a city or town, to borrow money outside of the 
debt limit ... 
It further provides that 
any petition for legislation raising any statutory limitation on ap-
propriations authorized to be made for any school purpose by the 
school committee in any city where the city council has unlim-
ited authority to make appropriations for all such purposes on 
the recommendation of the mayor and at the request of the 
school committee, shall be referred to the next annual session, 
unless when filed it be the petition or be approved by vote of the 
mayor and city council. 
The proposed Joint Rule 7A would require the approval of a 
county, city, or town in connection with legislation authorizing it "to 
appropriate or borrow money for any purpose, or to pay any claim for 
damages or otherwise, or affecting the salaries, reinstatement, retire-
ment, tenure or other status of a county, city or town officer or em-
ployee or to alter the benefits or change the restrictions of any county 
or municipal pension or retirement law." 
• Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Pt. I, Art. XIX. 
• To be numbered Rule 7A. 
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Some legislators undoubtedly felt that a constitutional amendment 
might be going too far in that it would prevent the General Court 
from taking legislative action in a particular situation where some ac-
tion might become necessary. Providing for home rule by a joint rule 
would be more flexible since such a rule could be suspended by a con-
current vote of two thirds of the members of each branch present and 
voting thereon.5 
The proposed Joint Rule 7A was adopted by the Senate but was re-
jected by the House on a roll-call vote, less than two thirds of the 
members present and voting thereon having voted in the affirmative. 
A similar proposal had been rejected by the House in 1953 without a 
roll-call vote. 
B. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
§24.4. Effective date of new law: Emergency preamble. The state 
rent control law! was approved as an emergency law on June 2, 1953. 
Twenty-five taxable inhabitants of the Commonwealth brought a peti-
tion under the General Laws, Chapter 29, Section 63, in which the 
validity of the enactment as an emergency measure and its constitu-
tionality were challenged.2 The following discussion is limited to the 
first issue. 
Article XLVIII of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Com-
monwealth, The Referendum, I, provides: "No law passed by the 
general court shall take effect earlier than ninety days after it has be-
come a law, excepting laws declared to be emergency laws and laws 
which may not be made the subject of a referendum petition, as 
herein provided." Article XLVIII, The Referendum, II, as amended 
by Article LXVII of the Amendments, reads in part: "A law declared 
to be an emergency law shall contain a preamble setting forth the 
facts constituting the emergency, and shall contain the statement that 
such law is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public 
peace, health, safety or convenience." The emergency preamble of the 
rent control law reads: "Whereas, The deferred operation of this act 
would tend to defeat its purpose which is, in part, to alleviate the se-
vere shortage of rental housing in certain areas of the commonwealth 
which shortage has caused a serious emergency detrimental to the 
public peace, health, safety and convenience, therefore this act is 
hereby declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health, welfare, safety and conven-
ience." 
The Court, in holding that the preamble was "adequate to validate 
the act as an emergency measure," stated: 
5 Joint Rule 33. 
§24.4. 1 Acts of 1953, c. 434. 
2 Russell v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 19:;4 Mass. Adv. Sh. 571, 120 N.E.2d 
388. 
8
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It contains the required statement that the law is necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, safety, and 
convenience, and sets forth as a fact that its purpose is to alleviate 
the severe shortage of rental housing in certain areas which has 
caused a serious emergency. Although, technically, it is the pur-
pose of the act which is stated as a fact, the statement amounts to 
a declaration that there is a severe shortage of rental housing in 
certain areas which has caused a serious emergency and that the 
purpose of the act is to alleviate this shortage.3 
§24.5. Legislative pension decisions. On January 7, 1954, the Su-
preme Judicial Court handed down two decisions, Roach v. State 
Board of Retirement! and McCarthy v. State Board of Retirement,2 
in which it reaffirmed the principle set forth in Kinney v. Contribu-
tory Retirement Appeal Board.3 Effective September 16, 1952, the 
General Court, in an extra session, passed an act entitled "An Act re-
pealing the legislation providing pensions or retirement allowances 
for members or former members of the General Court and for elected 
state officials." 4 In the Kinney case, the Court held that an assistant 
attorney general could be deprived of any right to have his service in 
the General Court computed as creditable service in the retirement 
system irrespective of whether on September 16, 1952, he was already 
in a position to claim retirement rights. The Court stated: "We in-
cline to agree with the more numerous decisions holding that a con-
tributory pension or retirement system, like a non-contributory system, 
commonly creates no vested and immutable rights resting upon con-
tract rather than upon legislative policy even after the beneficiary has 
become entitled to pension payments." 5 
In the McCarthy case, the same principle was applied even though 
the plaintiff's intestate had ceased to hold office, had been retired, and 
had actually begun to receive a retirement allowance. The Court 
said: "We believe that the Commonwealth has entered into no con-
tract of insurance with a legislator whose retirement is complete any 
more than with one who has not ceased to hold office." 6 
No opinion was expressed by the Court in any of the cases on the 
question as to recovery of contributions to the retirement fund. How-
ever, in the 1954 session of the legislature, provision was made for the 
return of contributions to the surviving beneficiary or legal represent-
ative of any former member of the General Court who is deceased.'T 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 572, 573, 120 N.E.2d at 389, 390. See, on the general sub-
ject, C.L., c. 4, §1; Prescott v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 299 Mass. 191, 12 
N.E.2d 462 (1938). 
§24.5. "1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 43, 116 N.E.2d 850. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 47, 116 N.E.2d 852. 
3330 Mass. 302, 113 N.E.2d 59 (1953). 
• Acts of 1952, c. 634. 
5330 Mass. 302, 306, 113 N.E.2d ,,9. 62 (1953). 
61954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 47, 49, 116 N.E.2d 852. 854. 
7 Acts of 1954, c. 615. 
9
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Several bills were filed in the last session which attempted to make 
the rights and benefits under contributory retirement systems contrac-
tual and not subject to impairment, but they failed of passage.s A 
provision of similar import is found in the General Laws, Chapter 32, 
Section 25(5), which provides that Sections 1 to 28 may be altered, 
amended or repealed, "provided, that no such alteration, amendment 
or repeal shall be deemed to reduce the amount of any annuity, pen-
sion or retirement allowance granted under the provisions of such sec-
tions ... or to affect adversely the rights of any person ... " With 
reference to this provision, the Court in the Kinney case stated: 
"Whatever may be the effect of this provision upon the power of the 
Legislature to alter, amend, or repeal the sections therein mentioned, 
upon which we imply no opinion, it can have no effect upon the 
power of the Legislature to deal with §28H out of the repeal of 
which the present controversy arises." 9 
In New York, benefits incident to membership in a retirement sys-
tem are protected by a constitutional amendment. The following 
new provision was adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1938 
and approved by vote of the people on November 8, 1938: "After July 
first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in any pension or retire-
ment system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a con-
tractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or 
impaired." 10 
§24.6. Applicability of veterans' tenure law to a legislative em-
ployee. In Sullivan v. Committee on Rules of the House of Repre-
sentatives,! it was held that the veterans' tenure law did not apply to 
a position in the legislative branch of the government. The peti-
tioner, a veteran, had been employed as director of fiscal affairs for the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives from 
January 13, 1949, to January 7, 1953, when the position was termi-
nated by vote of the respondent Committee on Rules. He contended 
that, having served "for not less than three years," he was entitled to 
the benefits of tenure of office and protection of the civil service laws.2 
The Court asserted that it was unable to discover that the legisla-
ture had manifested "the most unlikely intention" 3 of binding succes-
sive General Courts to the hire of an individual by one of its commit-
tees. 
The Court took judicial notice of the "well known historical fact" 4 
that legislatures in democracies reorganize along political lines after 
every state-wide election. Although this would have been enough to 
8 See Senate No. 434 and House No. 1521 and No. 1529. 
• 330 Mass. 302, 307, 113 N.E.2d 59, 62 (1953). 
10 N.Y. Const., Art. V, §7. 
§24.6. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 147, 117 N.E.2d 817. 
2 C.L., c. 30. §9A. 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 147. 149. 117 N.E.2d 817. 818. 
'1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 149. 117 N.E.2d at 819. 
10
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sustain its finding, the Court carefully examined the civil service laws 
and veterans' tenure provisions and concluded that positions in the 
legislative branch were excluded therefrom both by the letter5 and the 
spirit of these laws. 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 151, 117 N.E.2d at 820. 
11
Aisner: Chapter 24: Legislative Process and Statutory Interpretation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1954
